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Abstract. The indefinability of concepts is explored through the idea of a
conceptual scheme. Using the Stone duality of Boolean algebras indefinable
concepts are categorized as specific types of subspaces. Additionally, inde-
finability is formulated as a type of algebraic independence and conceptual
atomism is investigated from a mathematical perspective.
1. Goodness as Indefinable
The initial motivation for this investigation will be an exploration of goodness as
an indefinable concept. Indefinable, meaning lacking definition through other con-
cepts (that are not analytically equivalent to goodness). Other concepts can relate
to goodness through partly overlapping meanings, and every discourse on goodness
seems to recall a familiar association of nearby moral terms (pleasantness, justice,
fairness, etc.), but goodness is never precisely defined through that association.
Moore [7] compares the simplicity of goodness to the simplicity of yellowness,
’good’ is a simple notion, just as ’yellow’ is a simple notion; that,
just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one
who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain
what good is.
this is contrasted to a complex notion as a “horse,” which is possible to define,
because “a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can
enumerate.”
Toward the prospect of defining goodness, Moore answers,
My answer to it may seem a very disappointing one. If I am asked
’What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the
end of the matter. Or if I am asked ’How is good to be defined?’
my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say
about it.
Assuming that goodness is a simple as Moore means it, any conceptual analysis must
indeed run into an “end of the matter.” A combination of proximal concepts (a list
of necessary and sufficient conditions) might give an approximation of goodness,
but never an exact definition. An exact definition would conceal away, perhaps
hidden in one of the necessary and sufficient conditions, an analytic equivalence to
goodness itself, and the definition would amount to stating a tautology. However
simple concepts still admit of approximations through other concepts, and in that
sense the matter has not ended. For example, we might say: If a state-of-affairs is
unjust or unfair, then that state of affairs is not good. Or put symbolically,
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∀x (¬J (x) ∨ ¬F (x)→ ¬G (x))
where here, x ranges over a domain of morally relevant states-of-affairs. The exten-
sion of G – the good – will exclude states of affairs that are unjust, as well as those
that are unfair. Or equivalently: The good is contained within the complement of
the extensions of injustice and unfairness. This set containment might be thought
an approximation – or partial unraveling – of goodness. Our goal is to use this
set theoretic perspective to ground logical simplicity mathematically and to better
understand when to expect a list of “properties and qualities, all of which you can
enumerate.”
2. Conceptual Schemes
A family of concepts in logical relation will be called a conceptual scheme. Our
idea of a conceptual scheme agrees with Davidson’s usage in his critique of concep-
tual relativism [3]. Davidson describes the conceptual scheme thus:
Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experi-
ence; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of
sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures,
or periods survey the passing scene.
The idea of a conceptual scheme had gained traction at the time of Davidson’s
writing, as he puts it “Even those thinkers who are certain there is only one con-
ceptual scheme are in the sway of the scheme concept.” He further indemnifies the
conceptual scheme as “a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma.” Though it should
be noted that the idea of a framework of concepts as constructive of experience
can be traced much earlier to the Indian tradition. Something like a conceptual
scheme features prominently in the thought of Buddhist philosophers Dignāga and
Dharmak̄ırti,
He [Dignāga] says that conceptual construction is the interpreta-
tion of what is given in pure sensation by means of proper names,
words for general features, words for qualities, words for actions,
and words for individual substances. Our minds group unique par-
ticulars together and understand them as continuing objects bear-
ing types of properties. In other words, the constructive activity
of minds constitutes objects out of the flux of sensation. In real-
ity, there are no universals, no real stability and no entities with
determinant identities. [2]
The conceptual scheme structures sense data into what the subject experiences
as an arrangement of objects, and we might imagine a conceptual scheme as a
condition for the possibility of experiencing objects (in a vaguely Kantian sense).
Or as transformative of some James-like blooming and buzzing confusion. I will
not attempt to definitively place a conceptual scheme epistemologically or devel-
opmentally, but it will be assumed that a conceptual scheme interfaces between
sensation and ideas. If Davidson’s “passing scene” were a natural landscape, then
the carvings impressed upon nature, exactly how flowers distinguish and separate,
and these from a non-flowering tree, and exactly where roots and branches sepa-
rate from trunk, all these boundaries are conditional upon the scheme. Whether
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this boundary-making is correspondent with objective natural kinds or is purely
constructive will not be important for this work.
To proceed, a conceptual scheme must be made mathematically precise. Which
is not to argue that a conceptual scheme – however it functions as a faculty –
is mathematically precise. Or that somehow the blooming buzzing confusion of
James is tamed into figures as exact as those of Euclid. Often boundaries are
unclear, objects indistinct, and it is plain by introspection that any survey of the
passing scene is is full of ambiguity and inexactness. Mathematical formalism will
straighten these uncertainties, but only as a means to reach otherwise inaccessible
conclusions, not to deny the inherit messiness of experience.
What all concepts have in common – flower, roots, trunk, etc. – is a sorting of
objects into an interior and an exterior. Supposing U is the universe of existing
objects, then a concept A can be represented as a subset A ⊂ U . In logic, it is
typical to model a language in a domain of discourse, making its structures set-
theoretical. Where U is the domain, n-ary relations are sent to subsets of Un,
n-ary functions are sent to functions Un → U , and so on. Following this, unary
predicates are suitable mathematical representations of concepts, and a conceptual
scheme might be sought as a logical arrangement of unary predicates of a formal
language.
I will make use of the notations and conventions found in Marker’s Model Theory
textbook [6]. A first-order language L is a datum consisting of function symbols
F , relation symbols R and constant symbols C. An L-structure M is a set M
together with interpretations of function symbols as fM : Mnf → M for each
f ∈ F , relations as RM ⊂ MnR for each R ∈ R and constants cM ∈ M for each
c ∈ C. A sentence (a formula with no free-variables) is either true or false under
a model M, when a sentence φ is true under M we write M |= φ. A theory is a
set of L-sentences. Given a theory T , M is a model of T , written M |= T , when
M |= φ for all φ ∈ T .
Concepts should be represented by predicates, and a conceptual scheme as pred-
icates related through logical connectives. Thus, “All men are mortal,” connects
the concepts man and mortal, which symbolically reads ∀x (man (x)→ mortal (x)).
While “A bachelor is an unmarried man” connects bachelor to unmarried and man,
in symbols ∀x (batchelor (x)↔ unmarried (x) ∧man (x)). Logical relations between
concepts are sentences of this type, and a of such sentences that determines the
structure of a scheme form a theory, and objects (say of an ontology) model this
theory.
For a language L and a subset of predicate symbols P, define the family of simple
formulas Px = {p (x) : p ∈ P}, and further let P∗x be all formulas generated by Px
together with logical connectives {¬,∨,∧}. The formulas θ (x) ∈ P∗x will be called
conceptualizations (concepts are special types of conceptualizations).
Conceptual relations are sentences of the form ∀xθ (x) where θ (x) ∈ P∗x (for
example “all men are mortal”). These relations are alike to the “containments”
which Kant speaks of. Intuitively, we should select conceptual relations as axioms.
Where Q is a set of these axioms, we would then say conceptualizations ψ (x) and
ϕ (x) stand in logical relation when,
Q ` ∀x (ψ (x)→ ϕ (x))
It is reasonable to call the relation analytic, since it is possible to show “all ψ are
ϕ” by consulting the meanings of concepts alone.
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Definition. A conceptual scheme O is a pair (P,Q) where P is a signature of unary
predicate symbols, and Q is set of sentences of the form ∀xφ (x) with φ ∈ P∗x .
We assume that Q is satisfiable. Say U models the conceptual scheme O (in
symbols U |= O) when U |= Q. Supposing U |= O, then concept symbols P are
sent to subsets PU and any object u ∈ U induces a function on concepts,
I (u) (P ) =
{
1 when a ∈ PU
0 otherwise
the identification of u with I (u) is unique when an identity of indecernables holds
for the objects U with respect to the concepts P. Which is to say: If I (u) (P ) =
I (v) (P ) for all P ∈ P, then u = v.
Because U models the conceptual relations Q, any object u ∈ U respects those
same relations. When Q ` ∀x (P (x)→ Q (x)) and U |= Q, it follows PU ⊂ QU so
any u ∈ U respects this inclusion, and the induced function I (u) must also respect
the order of concepts. Stated vaguely for the time being: The function I (u) is
order-preserving from the structure of concepts to the two-element Boolean algebra
{0, 1}.
The relationship between conceptual schemes and objects resembles the rela-
tionship between a Boolean algebra and the points of its Stone space. Pressing
the analogy further: Concepts might be represented as topological sub-spaces and
objects as points of that topology. This may seem mathematically excessive, but
it recall our stated problem: How can a concept (like goodness) be undefinable
and yet approximatable? If U models the conceptual scheme, and U only has its
structure as a set (in the category of sets) we cannot say much. The extensions of
predicates are just elements of the power set 2U without any meaningful relation
to each other. But if U could be given a suitable topology, then problem is made
sensible, as we can deploy a variety of mathematical techniques to determine when
a subspace approximates another.
The n-th Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra Sn (T ) of a first-order theory T equates for-
mulas φ (x1, . . . , xn) ≈ θ (x1, . . . , xn) when T ` ∀x1, . . . , xn (φ (x1, . . . , xn)↔ θ (x1, . . . , xn)),
and orders these equivalence classes as [φ] ≤ [θ] when T ` φ → θ producing a
Boolean algebra. Since the signature of our language is just P all single variable for-
mulas are conceptualizations in P∗x and S1 (Q) are equivalence classes ψ ∼ ϕ where
Q ` ∀x(ψ (x)↔ ϕ (x)). These equivalences are analytic equivalences (ie, “bache-
lors” and “unmarried men” are equivalent). For a conceptual scheme O = (P,Q),
use the notation B (O) for the Boolean algebra S1 (Q).
Now that we have a Boolean algebra, we can make use of its Stone space. Indeed
since [φ (x)] ≤ [ψ (x)] is equivalent to φU ⊂ ψU for all models U |= O, any object
u ∈ U must induce a function I (u) : B (O)→ {0, 1} by setting,
I (u) ([φ (x)]) =
{
1 when u ∈ φU
0 otherwise
and therefore objects are mapped to points in the Stone space. Formally, the Stone
space of B (O) are also called the types of Q.
Definition. For a conceptual scheme O = (P,Q) define its conceptual spectrum
spec (O) to be the Stone space of B (O).
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Proposition 1. For any model U of a conceptual scheme O, supposing an identity
of indecnernables, the map I identifies U as a subspace of spec (O).
Proof. The function I is a well defined function since an object u ∈ U cannot
be identified with two points of the spectrum without causing an inconsistency
on the truth-value of some U |= φ (u) . For objects u, v ∈ U , if I (u) = I (v)
then I (u) ([φ (x)]) = I (v) ([φ (x)]) for all φ (x) ∈ P∗x , in particular for all simple
formulas P (x) where P is a unary predicate, but as we have assumed an identity of
indecernables, u = v in U . The image I (U) is given its subspace topology within
spec (O). 
3. Semantics of a Conceptual Scheme
Assume an identity of indecernables. We can think of a “passing scene” as a
model of the conceptual scheme – or as being a U where U |= O. An injective
function I : U → spec (O) identifies any object u ∈ U with a point in the conceptual
spectrum. Thus, points of the conceptual spectrum might be thought of as objects
of a kind, and yet spec (O) is a purely syntactical structure; which does not depend
upon the meanings of U , or any others, for its existence. If O had been interpreted
into another domain Z, then these Z-objects would likewise obtain as points in the
spectrum, possibly overlapping with U -objects, and yet holding no morphological
resemblance. One recalls what Hilbert said of his geometry: That it might hold as
well for tables, chairs and beer mugs as for points, straight lines and planes. Using
Hilbert’s example: Both geometric objects and bar paraphernalia are subspaces
– UG and UB respectively – of the conceptual spectrum. It is possible that the
intersection UG ∩UB be non-empty, where for a point p ∈ UG ∩UB it is impossible
to preference either meaning syntactically.
Earlier we evoked conceptual schemes in a vaguely Kantian way: A filter which
assembles sense-data of the “passing scene” into structured experience. The syntax
of a conceptual scheme as defined above (the non-logical symbols of a language and
a set of formulas Q serving as axioms) might be applied to a plurality of passing
scenes. Since the predicate symbols support a multiplicity of interpretations, it
is possible that one methodology of sorting (according to the relationships of Q)
would structure multiple worlds – organic, geometrical, bar-room – all with equal
epistemological fidelity.
It will be supposed that the signature P are symbols representing ideas set upon
a consistent type of passing scenes (bar room scenes, but no geometrical scenes).
Each symbol has its structuring function attached. Thus a concept like beer mug
selects-out all beer mugs discoverable within the passing scene to which it is applied.
The meaning of any concept is not tied to any particular scene, and instead sorts
scenes as it finds them. While this may seem a commitment to Platonism – since
even if all beer mugs vanished some idea of beer mug persists independently – it is
more a commitment to preserve the mode of structuring experience. To maintain
the conceptual scheme (and other ideas) as the world fluxes through it. William
James described a similar position in his Principles of Psychology:
Each conception thus eternally remains what it is, and never can
become another. The mind may change its states, and its meanings,
at different times; may drop one conception and take up another,
but the dropped conception can in no intelligible sense be said to
change into its successor. The paper, a moment ago white, I may
CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES AND THE INDEFINABILITY OF GOODNESS 6
now see to have been scorched black. But my conception ’white’
does not change into my conception ’black.’ On the contrary, it
stays alongside of the objective blackness, as a different meaning
in my mind, and by doing so lets me judge the blackness of the
paper’s change. Unless it stayed, I should simply say ’blackness’
and know no more. Thus, amid the flux of opinions and physical
things, the world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought
about, stands stiff and immutable, like Plato’s Realm of Ideas. [5]
The meaning of a concept is not necessarily archived in a museum of forms but
is assumed to be a constant in the perceiving subject, so that amid “the flux of
opinions and physical things” it stands “stiff and immutable.”
3.1. Possible Objects. Fixing the meaning of the concept to each predicate sym-
bol, a point u ∈ spec (O) describes all properties of u simultaneously. For each
predicate P (with its structuring function attached), there is assigned a true or
false answer u (P ). Such a point is a possible object, which might not be actual.
Further, the conceptual spectrum spec (O) in full is the space of all possible objects
and exhausts the ontological possibilities of a world.
Consider Hilbert’s bar-room world. A set of predicate symbols P post interpreta-
tion might refer to properties of beer mugs (quality, heaviness, thickness, sided-ness,
depth, color, etc. together with their relations). A point p in the conceptual spec-
trum is a logically possible beer mug held within an intersection of properties. A
corresponding physical beer mug may or may not be found in the world. The ideal
beer mug, the platonic form of a beer mug – whose glass is internally flawless and
whose surface holds the largest number of sparkles – is nowhere to be found in the
world, but the Platonic beer mug exists in the conceptual spectrum provided its
description as a set of properties respects the logical structure of the conceptual
scheme (it identifies a Boolean homomorphism B (O)→ {0, 1}).
Call U the objects possible with respect to a type of world (a possible bar-room
world, but not a geometrical world). There is a bijective correspondence between
possible objects and the conceptual spectrum, so we can topologize U as spec (O)
interpreted as possible objects, I will also use the notation specU (O) to emphasize
spec (O) interpreted as U.
The world proper is more diversely populated with objects than any bar-room
world, suppose a conceptual scheme suitably complex to make sense of this in-
creased diversity of ontological possibilities. An existing object is, as before, a
Boolean homomorphism of the form B (O) → {0, 1}, and possible objects are de-
scribed by the full conceptual spectrum specU (O). By an identity of indecernables
existing objects become a subspace of the conceptual spectrum. Existing objects at
some future or past identify their own subspaces. Realistically, it is likely a naive
conceptual chauvinism to expect that all discoverable objects have unique taxo-
nomic descriptions in fixed concepts, and would be proved so by some exotic future
discovery. Concepts adapt to new discoveries within experience. But taking for
granted that the conceptual scheme is fixed, then for every time t, existing objects
Ut are a subspace of specU (O).
One could also take the position that objects and conceptual schemes are correla-
tives. Object-hood means to be truth-functional on conceptions. Once a conceptual
scheme is specified all the possibilities of object-hood are implicitly given. When a
conceptual scheme surveying the “passing scene” is fixed, all objects discoverable in
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that passing scenery identify points of the conceptual spectrum, and Ut is always
a subspace of specU (O). If an object is discovered which has no identity in the
conceptual spectrum, it must be that the conceptual scheme has undergone a mod-
ification, the passing scene is being surveyed differently, consequently new objects
have been made discoverable.
A possible object need only satisfy the very minimal requirement of possibility
with respect to Q. Possible objects are logically coherent, this follows immediately
from the definition B (O) → {0, 1} (an object respects every logical relationship
between concepts). A platonic beer mug is possible, but not bachelors that are
married. Possible objects can be improbable. Pegasus (to reference Quine [9])
is conceptually possible, but physically improbable knowing that all existing or-
ganisms arrive through an evolutionary history confined within the boundaries of
natural law. The conceptual spectrum is thus like an ontology of objects gathered
from possible worlds, embracing everything that is not logically incoherent.
3.2. Semantics. The conceptual spectrum of O models O by sending f : P →
P specO = {u ∈ spec (O) : u (P ) = 1}. We know Q ` ∀x (ψ (x)→ ϕ (x)) implies
ψspecO ⊂ ϕspecO since spec (O) is the Stone space of B (O). There is a bijection
g : spec (O) → U identifying spec (O) with possible objects U. Composing g ◦ f
gives an interpretation g ◦ f : P → PU ⊂ U.
So we can think of P as its extension in possible objects, a representative clopen
subspace PU ⊂ specU (O). Likewise conceptualizations ψ (x) are sent to correspond-
ing clopen subspaces ψU. These subspaces will also be called conceptual subspaces.
3.3. Meanings. If ψ and ϕ have the same extension in possible objects do we say
ψ and ϕ have the same meaning? This is the same as the symmetric difference
θ (x) = (ψ (x) ∨ ϕ (x))∧ (ψ (x) ∧ ϕ (x))c being extensionless in possible objects. So
the question is equivalent to: If a conception has no possible object is it null?
A conception θ (x) being empty in specU (O) is by definition equivalent to Q `
∀x (¬θ (x)). So Q and ∃x (θ (x)) are mutually contradictory. I say this is sufficient
to claim that θ is “empty.”
It cannot be claimed that existing objects determine the meaning of a concept. A
listing of all existing good things does not necessarily determine goodness since that
list need not decide future good things. Existing things underdetermine goodness,
since what goodness discovered in one scene fails to disclose the meaning of goodness
as a filterer of passing scenes. Yet the extension of goodness onto possible objects
gathers what is good in all scenes and exhausts the meaning. Having gathered
the last good thing in the last possible world there is nothing left to be decided.
I claim that the meaning of a concept is its extension on possible objects. Put
differently: The meaning is the structuring function. In what follows, it is assumed
the extension of a conception in possible objects is faithfully representative of that
conceptions meaning.
Also on the topic of meanings, it should noted that not all conceptualizations
are sensible. Conceptualizations are logical combinations of concepts, therefore
something like M (x) ∨ T (x) which means “x is either mortal or a taxi-cab” is a
conceptualization, and has mathematical significance as a clopen subset of the con-
ceptual spectrum, but is not sensible to a speaker. This cost of allowing nonsense
comes at the benefit of the closed mathematical structure. An example, an auto-
homeomorphism specU (O)→ specU (O) necessarily sends clopen subsets to clopen
CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES AND THE INDEFINABILITY OF GOODNESS 8
subsets, or by Stone duality is an algebraic automorphism of B (O). These automor-
phisms need not preserve sense. Still, the automorphism group AutTop
(
specU (O)
)
would probably tell us something about the structure of specU (O) and so also of the
sense contained within. Permitting nonesense (mathematically) allows a stronger
grasping of sense.
4. Logical Simplicity of Goodness and Indefinables
4.1. Conceptualizations and Conceptual Analysis. Practically speaking, con-
ceptualizations coincide with the productions of conceptual analysis. Situated
within a conceptual scheme, a general list of conditions is identified with a formula
φ (x) where φ (x) ∈ P∗x (recall P∗x is all formulas generated by concepts together with
the standard connectives). Where D is the meaning to be explicated by analysis, a
necessary condition “for x to satisfy D it is necessary that x satisfy φ” is in symbols
∀x (D (x)→ φ (x)). Sufficient conditions correspond to ∀x (φ (x)→ D (x)). While
necessary and sufficient conditions have the form Q ` ∀x (D (x)↔ θ (x)). Thus any
analysis equates the meaning with a conceptualization.
The possible results of conceptual analysis are the conceptualizations P∗x . In
the conceptual spectrum, the extensions of concepts PU in possible objects are a
sub-basis of specU (O), the results of conceptual analysis are combinations of PU
under union, intersection and complement, or are clopen (conceptual) subsets of
specU (O).
4.2. The Good and Possible Objects. Concepts structure experience into an
interior and exterior. Goodness does exactly this, gathering whatever is good under
its extension. But so far, the representation of concepts is restricted to subsets of
possible objects φU ⊂ specU (O). These are families of objects, and it could be
argued that objects underdetermine goodness. Surely ethics involves more than a
listing of all good things. A masterful artwork might be called good, or a beautiful
piece of clothing, but it is doubtful that gathering all the best things would produce
the good. There are also good events, and preferable arrangements of the world,
neither of which reduce easily as objects. When Oedipus discovers his mother
Jocasta hanged, he removes pins from her dress and pierces his own eyes in despair,
and it is doubtful the scope of suffering could be reduced to the pins, the dress, and
the arrangement of objects generally.
To reconcile this insufficiency, it may be necessary to expand the ontology to
accommodate the extension of goodness. Recall that object, as we mean it, is
any truth function on concepts that respects conceptual relations, and concepts
are simply a way of sorting experience. Thus an object can be something other
than a thing. We can also take events, or activities, or states-of-affairs as objects.
Provided the concept functions by dividing experience into parts, and stands in
relation to other concepts (arranged by containment), then objects are whatever is
truth-functional with respect to conceptual relations (things, events, etc.).
4.3. Goodness as Indefinable. For a reference on basic point-set topology Munkres
is suitable [8]. We are now ready to formalize the indefinability of goodness. Sup-
pose, following Moore, that goodness is like yellowness, it cannot be defined except
by stating itself. Even so, goodness can be approximated through other concep-
tions. Where J symbolizes justice, suppose a relationship:
6 ∃x (G (x) ∧ ¬J (x))
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in other words, there are no objects that are both good and unjust. This is so
analytically when Q `6 ∃x (G (x) ∧ ¬J (x)), which is represented in the conceptual
spectrum as GU ∩
(
JU
)c
= 0 or GU ⊂ JU.
Then we can at least say that, in terms of sets, the just gives an approximation of
the good. Still finer approximations of goodness are obtainable through additional
combinations of proximal concepts. With ethical investigation, the good might
be approached through finer approximations. While these investigations might not
terminate, they perform the philosophical work of sketching more accurate pictures.
Imagine a series of approximations converging upon the good asymptotically,
constructed through a list of necessary conditions GU ⊂ PUi . This list might include
the above “A good state-of-affairs is just,” Greek formulas as “The good life is
virtuous and virtue is to live in accordance with reason,” demands made of the
passions “Love your neighbor,” and so on.
There is an n-th approximation of the good:
GU ⊂
n⋂
i=1
PUi
suppose the approximation is never exact. For any n there is always some disagree-
ment (a counter-example) between GU and the approximation
⋂n
i=1 P
U
i . Yet, as
philosophical investigation continues, additional conditions are discovered to rec-
oncile these counter-examples. These approximations tend towards exactness, and
if inquiry could be continued indefinitely,
GU =
∞⋂
i=1
PUi
The definition GU =
⋂∞
i=1 P
U
i gives goodness as a closed set of the conceptual
spectrum. But it is unclear whether GU is also open. In other words, it is unclear
that GU is a conceptual subspace, and whether there exists a conceptualization
φ with the same extension in the conceptual spectrum. The same process could
occur with respect to an indefinite list of sufficient conditions PUi ⊂ GU so that
GU =
⋃∞
i=1 P
U
i , and now GU is a open subset which may not be closed.
If goodness is included in the conceptual scheme, then goodness is definable and
is represented by a conceptual subset automatically. The circumstance is rather:
Given a conceptual scheme that lacks goodness but includes a family of normative
concepts (justice, fairness, naturalness, utility, beauty, etc.) proximal to goodness,
it is possible that the extension of goodness fails to be a conceptual subspace?
Definition 2. An indefinable with respect to a conceptual scheme O is a Borel
subset of the conceptual spectrum X = specU (O) such that there exists no concep-
tual subset K with X = K. In particular open and closed indefinables are properly
open and closed subsets respectively.
The Borel algebra is evoked because, permitting both open and closed subsets to
represent meanings beyond the scope of definition, then combinations of these sets
under intersections, unions and complements should also represent logical combina-
tions of those meanings. The Borel algebra closes these set operations. Addition-
ally, it will be shown shortly that, with respect to the asymptotic process hinted
at above, Borel subsets are the correct “limit points” of conceptual subsets. These
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contain all the limits which the idealized inquirers of Peirce would terminate upon,
were each set to work on a conceptual analysis with unlimited time.
4.4. Open Indefinables as Family Resemblances. An important class of inde-
finables are what Wittgenstein refers to as family resemblances (or at least resem-
blances satisfying certain assumptions). Wittgenstein asks us to consider games,
and to “look and see whether there is anything common to all.” [10] Is it possible
to list necessary and sufficient conditions which precisely captures the activity of
games? Probably there is no such list of conditions. Some games are played with a
team, others are solitary. Many games are officiated, but some are not. Some keep
score, others do not.
But suppose that for every example of an activity that is clearly a game, that
game is contained within the extension of a conceptualization that only contains
games (ie, locally sufficient conditions). For example: If the activity involves co-
operating with teammates against a competing team, while keeping score, and is
done for leisure, then the activity is a game. Let us suppose these conditions are
not necessary to all games, but are sufficient. Some games might not satisfy these
conditions, but these exceptions will have their own local sufficient conditions. In
other words, every clear and distinct game has a (clopen) neighborhood of games
resembling it.
We can express this within the conceptual spectrum: For any game g there is a
clopen neighborhood ψUg so that g′ ∈ ψUg implies that g′ is also a game. We could
imagine a neighborhood constricting about g (in topological terms, perhaps a filter
convergent upon g), eventually the neighborhood will be small enough that any
activity within it is almost indistinguishable from g, and so should also be called a
game.
Therefore the extension of games (both actual and possible), is expressible as:
W =
⋃
g
{
ψUg : g is a game
}
and a failure to conceptually analyzeWU originates in its being an open indefinable.
In general, open indefinables are analogues of family resemblances, since any
open U is expressible as
⋃
x∈U ψ
U
x , meaning that an open indefinable is governed
by local conditions. Given y sufficiently close to x ∈ U , y will resemble x enough
to fall within the resemblance. Yet there are no global conditions.
Since the concepts of a conceptual scheme are countable, the corresponding
Boolean algebra will be at most countably infinite, and the Stone space is sepa-
rable. Therefore any U =
⋃
x∈U ψ
U
x is expressible as U =
⋃∞
i=1 ψ
U
i . In other words,
any open indefinable is produced by a countable list of conceptual conditions. An
open subset U =
⋃∞
i=1 ψ
U
i has an analysis when it is also closed, when this occurs,
because specU (O) is compact, the cover reduces to a finite list of conditions and
becomes a definition.
4.5. Closed Indefinables as Apophatic Concepts. Games could also be a
closed indefinable, in that case the complement of games (non-games) are an open
subset,W c =
⋃
x
{
ψUx : x is not a game
}
, which could also be argued a type of fam-
ily resemblance which is the complement to an open family resemblance: In this
case, for every non-game x, there exists a local neighborhood ψUx where all x′ ∈ ψUx
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are also non-games. Since specU (O) is second-countable, W =
⋂∞
i=1
(
ψUi
)c
=⋂∞
i=1 (¬ψi)
U, and the ¬ψi are a countably infinite set of necessary conditions.
Closed indefinables have a distinct epistemological character wherein meaning is
disclosed by an infinite series of negations. The form W =
⋂∞
i=1
(
ψUi
)cis the final
result of a process specU (O) , specU (O)− ψU1 ,
(
specU (O)− ψU1
)
− ψU2 , . . .
A inquirer of Pierce set to the task would progress through the removal of space,
like the creation of a sculpture, with the final result revealed through infinitely
many movements of the chisel.
Another name for closed indefinables might be an apophatic concept. Knowledge
through negation. Apophatic knowledge has a long history, especially in theology,
whose main object – the divine – is always just beyond the the scope of language.
In apophatic theology God is known by stating what God is not. Therefore “God
is not evil” would be elected rather than “God is good” (which bounds God under
the scope of human goodness). Aquinas [1] takes this approach when he writes,
“Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have
no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.”
Here is not the place for a theological discourse. It is enough to note that
this same ineffability might also effect material investigations. Many of the most
important philosophical concepts could be of this form, an example being the same
good that we have already discussed at length. What is at the very interior of
goodness? What is good without exception? That I cannot say. Yet the bad is
often plain to see. Corruptions introduce themselves by name and injustices cry
out like sirens. Wrongs are easier to account.
Imagining the good is an open subset, the good takes the form GU =
⋃∞
i=1 ψ
U
i ,
there exist local conditions ψUi such any every object satisfying ψUi is good (without
any counter-example). This seems unlikely. Even the most uncontroversial condi-
tions, like being in a state of true love, admits of exceptions. Somewhere in the
world a person is truly in love together with some twisting or unexpected pathology.
But conversely, there are corruptions of love which are corrupt in every case. This
phenomenon of the wrong being distinct seems to generalize. It is easier to give
local conditions for wrongness, such that wrongness becomes an open indefinable
and the good is its complement.
A related example: What is the ideal society? Here again it is much easier to list
societies that should not be. It is possible to say that a society is better than others
but difficult to claim it is best. So it is sometimes said of democracy: It is the worst
form, except for all the others. Meanwhile, corrupt and unjust societies are easy
to identify. They are as blatant as the lurid “scarlet banners” that Winston passes.
Perhaps then, the best society is the civilization remaining after every incivility
has been excised. Put in terms of Hegel: A tension develops into a contradiction
and is then overcome. Ideal society is what remains after every contradiction has
been resolved and the dialectical process is concluded; but conceivably, this dialectic
might never terminate, and in every society there will be something to be overcome.
5. Finite and Infinite Conceptual Schemes
Thus-far we have taken for granted that a conceptual scheme is infinite. Inde-
finability does not occur for finite schemes. A finite scheme has a finite Boolean
algebra, and so the conceptual spectrum spec (O) has finitely many points (there
are at most |B (O)|2 many functions between B (O) and {0, 1}). The Stone space
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of a finite Boolean algebra is discrete (since finite Hausdorff spaces are discrete).
Therefore all subsets of spec (O) are conceptual subsets. In the worst case any
meaning has a definition by listing the objects in its extension by brute-force (halt-
ing in finite time).
Are conceptual schemes finite? The human being is, from all angles, a finite
being – so a finite conceptual scheme is consistent with the finitude that bounds
other human potentials. A finite conceptual scheme would also promise solutions
to the most thorny problems. Every analysis halts in finite time. Goodness feels
intractable, but is in truth just very complicated.
Yet this optimism is at odds with the existence of what seem to be genuinely in-
soluble philosophical puzzles and philosophical disputes spanning centuries. Moral
dilemmas which pass from generation to generation like a riddling inheritance.
Finiteness promises an answer. Yet even elementary moral puzzles like “Is it right
to lie for the greater good?” are pursued into cases and sub-cases interminably.
Yet these century-spanning disputes are not without progress. The Greeks also
asked “Is it right to lie for the greater good?” but it is incorrect to say nothing
has been achieved since their efforts. Discoveries made in the interim – the Cat-
egorical Imperative, different forms of Utilitarianism, etc. – approach the puzzle
from different sides unraveling it further. The puzzle is not solved, but is in a more
advanced state of solution.
Philosophy advances without final solutions, and this style of discourse, with
indefinite ends converged upon asymptotically, fits infinite conceptual schemes, not
finite schemes.
We should be careful to distinguish between finite conceptual schemes and po-
tentially infinite schemes. A finite conceptual scheme has an absolute upper limit
on the number of its concepts, a potentially infinite scheme might have N -many
known concepts (for example, a natural language accompanied by a dictionary
bound with finitely many pages), but where those N -concepts fit within a scheme
of (N + 1)-many concepts. Potentially infinite schemes track better with natural
language: Since were there an upper-limit of concepts N , a novel conceptualizing
would invent conception N + 1, which is a contradiction, so there is no upper limit.
A conceptual extension can be formalized as the inclusion of concepts in a larger
family of concepts in a way that preserves the original conceptual relations.
Definition 3. For two schemes O1 = (P1,Q1) and O2 = (P2,Q2), say O2 extends
O1 when P1 ⊂ P2 and for conceptual formulas φ, ϕ ∈ (P1)∗x,Q2 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)),
if and only if, Q1 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)).
Proposition 4. If O2 extends O1 then there is an inclusion of the Boolean algebra
B (O1) into B (O2).
Proof. Define h : B (O1)→ B (O2) by sending [φ]1 → [φ]2 (the equivalence classes
are respective to Q1 and Q2). The partial order on B (Oi) (i = 1, 2) is defined by:
For φ, ϕ ∈ (Pi)∗x, [φ]i ≤ [ϕ]i when Qi ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)). Therefore for φ, ϕ ∈
(P1)∗x ⊂ (P2)
∗
x, [φ]1 ≤ [ϕ]1 implies Q1 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)) which by assumption
implies Q2 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)) and therefore [φ]2 ≤ [ϕ]2. And [φ]2 ≤ [ϕ]2 implies
Q2 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)), which by assumption implies Q1 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)) and
therefore [φ]1 ≤ [ϕ]1. So h is an order isomorphism onto its image. 
It is simpler to think of a conceptual extension as an inclusion of Boolean alge-
bras. The process of N -many concepts extending as (N + 1)-concepts corresponds
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to something like an ascending sequence of Boolean algebras B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ B3 ⊂ · · ·
with Bi+1 6= Bi. By setting B∗ =
⋃
Bi, B∗ is a Boolean algebra which is infinite
and has an infinite Stone space.
Picture one of Pierce’s inquirers working on a definition of goodness with unlim-
ited time. At a given stage, the inquirer might could be working within a scheme
Bn, and at a latter stage Bk, and so on. The asymptotic limit can belong to an
infinite conceptual scheme while each moment of investigation was enclosed in a
finite language. A meaning can be infinitely subtle, which is intended upon with
finite efforts.
Recall that existing objects were made a subspace of the conceptual spectrum.
If GU is the extension of goodness in possible objects and U are existing objects,
then GU ∩ U might have finitely many objects – and a brute-force approach to
defining the good, by listing all good objects, is achievable. But the objects of any
present are insufficient for supporting the meanings of concepts. To define goodness
as a list, one would need to gather past goods, and future goods, and goods from
possible worlds, and so on. This relates back to our Kantian sense of the concept:
A way of dividing up the “passing scene” and of structuring experiences. A way
of sorting is not determined by what was sorted at a particular instance. This
could be where the thorns of thorny philosophical problems come from. If the task
were to define good with respect to a snapshot of existing objects, perhaps that is
achievable. But defining, not what is sorted, but the mode of sorting itself – this
proves more elusive.
6. Approximations
We have spoken already about conceptualizations approximating indefinable
meanings, and that complete knowledge of an indefinable meaning is the obtain-
ment of an asymptotic limit of this approximation. These approximations can
be made mathematically precise. Let Σ (O) be the Borel algebra of the topo-
logical space spec (O) and say λ is a measure, producing the measurable space
(spec (O) ,Σ (O) , λ). Defining pλ : Σ (O)× Σ (O)→ R+ by
pλ (a, b) = λ (a4b)
gives a psuedo-metric. The psuedo-metric can be made a proper metric, under
which Σ (O) becomes a complete metric, by defining an equivalence relation a ∼ b
when pλ (a, b) = 0 (ie, when a and b overlap almost everywhere) and using the
equivalence classes as points [4].
Require that the choice of measure is positive on non-empty clopen subsets
(equivalently pλ (a, b) > 0 when a and b are distinct conceptual subspaces).
Approximations can be made to coincide with metric convergence, wherein a
sequence of conceptualizations Kn converges to an indefinable X in the metric
sense,
pλ (Kn, X)→ 0
so long as we are prepared to equate both Borel subsets that overlap almost every-
where.
Let Σ (O)λ be the equivalence classes of Borel subsets that coincide almost-
everywhere under λ. Nice approximations correspond to regularity properties of
the measure. A measure λ is called inner-regular when,
µ (X) = sup {µ (K) : K ⊂ X, K is compact}
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and outer-regular when,
µ (X) = inf {µ (U) : X ⊂ U, U is open}
and is called regular when both inner and outer-regular. A conceptual scheme O is
at most countably infinite. Therefore the conceptual spectrum spec (O) is the Stone
space of a countable Boolean algebra which is a compact, separable and metrizable
space. Any Borel probability measure on a compact metric space is regular.
Proposition 5. If λ is a probability measure on spec (O) then conceptualizations
are dense in the metric space (Σ (O)λ , pλ).
Proof. Let U be open in spec (O), since spec (O) is second-countable, U =
⋃∞
i=1Ki
where Ki are clopen subsets, and setting Un =
⋃∞
i=1Ki gives a convergent sequence
Un → U under pλ. Therefore clopen subsets are dense in open subsets. For any
Borel subset X and real ε > 0, because λ is outer-regular there is U so that
pλ (X,U) = λ (X4U) ≤ ε/2, and a clopen subsetK so that pλ (K,U) = λ (U4K) ≤
ε/2, and by the triangle inequality pλ (X,K) ≤ ε. So Borel subsets are limit points
of clopen subsets. 
Since (Σ (O)λ , pλ) is a complete metric space it is appropriate to think of the
Borel algebra of a conceptual spectrum as containing all the limits of inquiry
(though not all Borel subsets are limits of inquiry, since many are not sensible).
7. Conceptual Extensions and the Relativity of Indefinablity
We have argued that goodness cannot be defined through proximal normative
concepts like justice and naturalness, but indefinability need not be unique to good-
ness. If goodness cannot be defined in terms of justice, then why not the converse?
Indeed, we could have begun with justice rather than goodness and the discussion
may have proceeded as before. Indefinability is a relationship between concepts.
Goodness is not unique as an indefinable, neither is there a most indefinable of
indefinables; instead, for a family of concepts, a relationship of definability or in-
definability might hold.
It is useful to imagine a conceptual extension as analogous to an extension of
fields O2/O1 and indefinability as a type of algebraic independence. The irrational
number
√
2 cannot be reached through any arithmetic combination of rational num-
bers. Regardless of how many times rational numbers are added, multiplied, sub-
tracted and divided, the square-root of two will never result. The square-root of
two might be adjoined to the rational numbers Q
(√
2
)
. The rationals are also
missing the square-root of three, motivating the extension Q
(√
3
)
. But Q
(√
2
)
is
missing the square-root of three and Q
(√
3
)
is missing the square-root of two. A
larger field Q
(√
2,
√
3
)
can be formed containing both. Here, neither
√
2 nor
√
3
is privileged as the more important algebraic transcendent, rather both are in a
relationship of mutual algebraic independence.
This is a fitting analogue to indefinability. A base conceptual scheme O can
be extended O (G) to included goodness. The same base scheme lacks a precise
definition of justice, so O (J) is constructed. But O (G) cannot define justice, and
also the converse, and so O (G, J) is constructed containing both.
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7.1. Conceptual Extensions and Ontological Issues. An indefinable π was
defined as a Borel subset of the conceptual spectrum. So intuitively, adjoining the
indefinable could involve forcing that Borel subset to be a clopen subset, further
disconnecting the topology. That is straightforward, but it introduces some subtle
technical issues. Namely given an extension O (π) of O, it is not guaranteed that
spec (O (π)) has the same objects as spec (O). We have assumed the meaning of
π to be a set of objects in spec (O), but if spec (O (π)) has its own objects, then
would not π need those objects to express its meaning?
For a conceptual extension O1 ⊂ O2 there is an injective map i : B (O1) →
B (O2). Because the Stone functor sends injections to surjections (and surjections
to injections), the injection induces a surjective continuous map,
spec (i) : spec (O2)→ spec (O1)
The map spec (i) will generally fail to be injective.
Definition 6. A conceptual extension is O2/O1 is proper when B (O1) is a proper
subalgebra of B (O2).
Proposition 7. For a proper conceptual extension O2 of O1, spec (i) : spec (O2)→
spec (O1) is not injective.
Proof. Any stone space is compact and Hausdorff. It is a topological fact that an in-
jective continuous map between compact Hausdorff spaces establishes a homeomor-
phism between domain and image. If the mapping spec (i) : spec (O2)→ spec (O1)
were injective, then (spec (i)) (spec (O2)) ≈ spec (O1), but spec (i) is surjective, so
that spec (i) is a homeomorphism. Applying Stone duality implies i : B (O1) ↪→
B (O2) is an isomorphism, contradicting that O2 was a proper extension. 
The map spec (i) : spec (O2)→ spec (O1) is explicitly a restriction spec (i) (u) =
u|B(O1). Two objects u, v ∈ spec (O2) are mapped together in when u|B(O1) =
v|B(O1). In other words, when objects u and v become indistinguishable in the
sub-scheme. This captures an intuition that, surveying the “passing scene” with
fewer conceptions implies fewer opportunities for objects to distinguish themselves
as such. While admiring a landscape, what separates leaf from leaf and flower from
flower, and where roots separate from trunk (if at all), depends upon lines drawn
upon the scene and the cleavages made in nature. Less line-making provides fewer
ways for parts of the scene to separate themselves.
7.2. Transfinite Extensions. For a conceptual extension O2 = (P2,Q2) of O1 =
(P1,Q1), it is necessary that P1 ⊂ P2 and for conceptual formulas φ, ϕ ∈ (P1)∗x,
Q2 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)), if and only if, Q1 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ ϕ (x)). A prototype for
an extension was given above as the adjunction of a (Borel) indefinable π forming
O2 = O1 (π). In this case π has an extension in the base conceptual spectrum
which can be used for interpretation. But before dealing with this case, we should
treat conceptual extensions in general, where P1 ⊂ P2, but the conceptualizations
(P2)∗x have no given interpretation in spec (O1). There is a map spec (i) : specO2 →
specO1 which fails to be injective. It is possible to realize the conceptual spectrum
of O1 in the conceptual spectrum of O2 by choosing, through the axiom of choice,
one object per fiber (spec (i))−1 (u).
In other words, a function η : specO1 → specO2 so that spec (i) ◦ η = idspecO1
(with respect to the assumptions, this function is not continuous). A choice of η
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allows a construction of an interpretation ofO2 into specO1, since any φ ∈ (P2)∗x has
a restriction onto the subspace φspecO2 ∩ η (specO1). This gives an interpretation,
φη,specO1 = η−1
(
φspecO2 ∩ η (specO1)
)
Proposition 8. Any choice of η models O2 in specO1.
Proof. Generally any subspace X ⊂ specO2 models O2. Since by setting φX =
X∩φspecO1 for any conceptual relation φspecO2 ⊂ ϕspecO2 it holds that φspecO2∩X ⊂
ϕspecO2 ∩X. Given a bijection f : X → Y , setting φY = f
(
φspecO2 ∩X
)
models
O2 in Y . Apply this with specO1 and η. 
But given what an indefinable has meant so far, the choice of η would be less
arbitrary, since the meaning of an indefinable had an extension as a Borel subset
of the base conceptual spectrum. For example, when goodness is a proper closed
subset G =
⋂∞
i=1 ¬ψUi , goodness is converged upon by sculpting away ψUi and the
final shape of the good is revealed in the limit. From this perspective, goodness
is a remainder of objects within specU (O). Although G is not a clopen subset,
the assumption is that the objects in the extension of G express the meaning of
goodness.
We want the extension of an indefinable (as a Borel subset) to express its mean-
ing. This will hold when an interpretation φ → φη,specO1 models conceptions in
spec (O1) as Borel subsets, preserving the conceptual relations of the higher scheme.
That is, φ and θ are analytically equivalent in the higher scheme, if and only if,
their extensions as Borel subsets in the base conceptual spectrum coincide.
Definition 9. An extension O2/O1 is transfinite over O1 when there exists an
interpretation of O2 into spec (O1), so that each conception is interpreted as a
Borel subset, and:
(1) Any ψ ∈ (P1)∗x is sent to its standard interpretation as a clopen subset of
spec (O1).
(2) Given φ, θ ∈ (P2)∗x, Q2 ` ∀x (φ (x)→ θ (x)), if and only if, φspecO1 ⊂
θspecO1 as Borel subsets of spec (O1).
For example, given an indefinable π ⊂ spec (O), the symbol π in O (π) is interpreted
as π ⊂ spec (O). Generally a choice of η : specO1 → specO2 sends specO1 to a
subspace η (specO1) and it cannot be assumed that Q2 |= ∀x (φ (x)→ θ (x)), if
and only if, φspecO2 ∩ η (specO1) ⊂ θspecO2 ∩ η (specO1). A transfinite extension
is such that conceptual relations are Borel order relations in the base conceptual
spectrum, allowing meanings to be faithfully represented as Borel subsets of the
original ontology.
7.3. Indefinability as Algebraic Transcendence. Schemes have ontologies of
possible objects native to themselves. It will be useful to fix an ontology so that
all concepts (including those in an indefinability relation) can be represented as
extensions in a common space of objects.
Definition. By a discourse we mean a family of meanings and a base concep-
tual scheme O0 so that all meanings are represented faithfully as Borel subsets of
spec (O0). A scheme O belongs to a discourse when O is a transfinite extension of
O0 and is generated by meanings within the discourse.
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When O belongs to the discourse, the interpretation O into spec (O0) gives an
isomorphism of B (O) into a Boolean sub-algebra of Σ (O0) . Schemes O belonging
to the discourse are modeled as Boolean algebras A |= O situated as B (O0) ⊂ A ⊂
Σ (O0). Conceptual extensions O2/O1 become A1 ⊂ A2. All meanings are Borel
subsets and indefinability occurs exactly at incidents of algebraic transcendence:
When a meaning π ∈ Σ (O0) is not in A, or equivalently when A is a proper
sub-algebra of 〈A ∪ {π}〉.
For example, Moore’s naturalistic fallacy might be formalized: If G is the exten-
sion of goodness, and A |= O where A is a scheme of purely naturalistic concepts,
then G 6∈ A. Goodness is transcendent with respect to naturalistic concepts. Put
another way, adjoining goodness G to a scheme of naturalistic concepts results in
a proper extension of Boolean algebras.
The analogy between conceptual extensions and field extensions is now clearer:
B (O0) functions like a base-field while the Borel algebra is something like an alge-
braic closure. It is a known fact that sigma-algebras are either finite or uncountable.
In our case Σ (O0) will be uncountably infinite. Meanwhile A is at most countably
infinite. The algebras are directed: For A1, A2 ⊂ Σ (O0) there exists A3 = 〈A1, A2〉
containing both, contained in Σ (O0).
Permitting some imaginative vagueness, the analogy is something like: O0 are the
rational numbers, extensions are number fields, indefinables are irrational numbers,
the Borel algebra are the complex numbers.
8. Atomism vs Holism
Moore evokes two senses of indefinability. First, that the concept has no defini-
tion in terms other than itself (“yellow is yellow”), and secondly that the concept is
atomic, meaning it is irreducible with respect to the other concepts of the scheme
(“It is in this sense that I deny good to be definable. I say that it is not composed of
any parts, which we can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it”).
With respect to the ideas developed so far, these senses are actually not equivalent.
The first means that π cannot be defined within a certain conceptual scheme that
lacks π. The second means that π is present in the conceptual scheme where it is
also atomic.
For example, supposing the meaning of goodness is apophatic with respect to a
conceptual scheme O (its extension is a properly closed subset of that conceptual
spectrum), then G is definable in O (G) but not in O. But, does the fact that G
had no definition in O mean that it has “no parts” in O (G)?
If there were conceptual atoms, mathematically they should be represented as
symbols A = {α1, α2, . . .} ⊂ P that generate all formulas P∗x through connectives
{∨,∧,¬}. Ie, atoms combine into compounds. Their equivalence classes [αi (x)]
would then be generators of the Boolean algebra B (O). If a conceptual scheme
O is generated by A, the conceptual extension O (π) is generated by A ∪ {π}. So
far, the claim of π to atomicness is supportable. But are these generators free
of substitutable parts? Working in the Boolean algebra B (O) gives an algebraic
answer. One type of atomicness is an atom of the Boolean algebra B (O). These
are conceptualizations a ∈ B (O) so that, if b ∈ B (O) and b ≤ a, then b = 0.
Another type of atomicness would correspond to irreduciblity. In a lattice, a is
meet-irreducible when a = b∧c implies that either a = b or a = c. Join-irreducibility
means a = b ∨ c implies a = b or a = c.
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If α ∈ P∗x is such that [α (x)] is an atom, then [α (x)] is represented by an isolated
point in the stone space, assuming an identity of indiscernibles, such an atom is a
conceptualization with a unique object in its extension. Put another way: Boolean
atoms are names.
Next, if [α (x)] is meet-irreducible, it is a standard fact of distributive lattices
that meet irreducible elements generate prime (order) ideals, but all such prime
ideals are also maximal in Boolean algebras. These maximal ideals are correspond
to unique points of the Stone space. So are also names. A join-irreducible [α (x)]
is such that [α (x)]c = [¬α (x)] is meet-irreducible, so that ¬α is a name.
A name would not be a conceptual atom in as much as a concept is meant to
integrate a plurality of objects. Atoms are even more unlikely when all operations
are compositionally permitted. Regarding B (O) as a Boolean ring, such an atom
is decidedly contrary to the nature of a ring as an algebraic structure. How many
ways can an integer be constructed through arbitrary additions and multiplications
of other integers? Infinitely many ways.
A less ambitious attempt at atomism would make conceptual generators [A] =
{[α1 (x)] , [α2 (x)] , . . .} of the Boolean algebra B (O) the atoms (even when they are
not Boolean atoms or irreducibles). These atoms form all compounds even when
they themselves are reducible into parts. But these generators are not unique.
There can be many such families of generators. Reminiscent of the basis of a
vectorspace. A basis vector decomposes under an alternate basis and there is no
way to preference one basis above another. So it is here, another set of generators
would have as much a claim to atomicness as the first.
Such alternative generators appear possible. For example, when h : B (O) →
B (O) is an automorphism, then h ([A]) ⊂ B (O) must also generate B (A), and
this set of generators is alternate when h ([A]) 6= [A]. Any generator [α (x)] ∈ [A]
decomposes under h ([A]). Although it should be noted that automorphisms need
not conserve sense. It is true that h : B (O) → B (O) sends conceptualizations
to conceptualizations, but conceptualizations are logical combinations of concepts
which need not always be sensible. It is possible that h ([A]) are not all sensible
(and therefore is less a candidate for a set of generators). But the construction does
motivate the possibility that generators would not be unique.
Rather than vindicating atomism, a more holistic view is confirmed. Something
like a post-structuralist mantra that “language always points to other language”
holds (though without the break with the signified, since objects and schemes are
correlatives). Inter-dependence, at least in this very formalized model, are algebraic
combinations. As 12 = 2 · 6 = 2 · (3 + 3) = 2 · (3 + (5− 2)) and these combinations
can be compounded indefinitely.
A mathematical straightforward justification of inter-dependence is as follows:
Supposing a conceptualization [θ] is changed to [θ′], then for all definitions that
connected to [θ] originally should be altered by a substitution of [θ′] for [θ]. That
is, [θ ∨ φ] → [θ′ ∨ φ] , [(¬θ ∨ φ) ∧ ϕ] → [(¬θ′ ∨ φ) ∧ ϕ], and so on. In other words
an automorphism h where h ([θ]) = [θ′]. Any automorphism h of a Boolean algebra
B defines a fixed sub-algebra Bh = {a ∈ B : h (a) = a} (since if h (a) = a and
h (b) = b then h (a ∨ b) = h (a)∨h (b) = a∨b, and so on). Thus it is possible to alter
a concept and leave others fixed. But immediately: Either the fixed sub-algebra of
h is a proper sub-algebra, or h is the identity (and no alterations occurred). Thus
no concept can be disturbed without disturbing conceptualizations elsewhere.
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